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One Store, Two Employment Systems: Core, Periphery and Flexibility in China’s 
Retail Sector 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Research on ‘flexible’ or ‘contingent work’, derived primarily from manufacturing and 
production contexts in Western settings, has often been theorized in terms of a core-
periphery model. Based upon ethnographic research on vendor representatives and 
regular store employees conducted at a multinational retail firm in China, we indicate that 
this model is insufficient to capture the complexity of employment arrangements in this 
context. This paper delineates the co-existence of two employment systems and a 
quadrilateral relationship in which workers’ interests sometimes overlap but often 
compete. Our research also indicates that institutional arrangements in China 
significantly affect the strategies that are open to firms and the consequent structure of 
employment relations.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Economic and social economic changes have put organizations under pressure to increase 
flexibility in their employment system (Kalleberg 2003). Consequently, since the early 
1980s, contingent work arrangements have become more widespread (Hakim 1990; 
Smith 1994; Voudouris 2004; Walsh 2007). An extensive literature on this subject in the 
West focuses on what is referred to as ‘flexible’ or ‘contingent work’ (e.g. Atkinson 1984; 
Cappelli and Neumark 2004; Geary 1992; Kalleberg 2001), with notions of ‘core’ and 
‘peripheral’ labour as a central feature of discussion. However, although there are 
exceptions (e.g. Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler 2002; Deery and Walsh 2002; Smith 1994; 
Walsh 1990; Walsh and Deery 1999), most analyses on flexibility derive from 
manufacturing and production settings, fewer still focus on the retail sector (Baret et al. 
2000; Nätti 1990; Wong 2001). This imbalance may distort our understanding of 
flexibility. When workers produce services or work on people, we might anticipate 
finding different organizational forms of flexibility, as well as different outcomes to those 
found in production settings (Smith 1997).  
 
The retail sector plays an increasingly important role in economies. Despite this, retail 
sector human resource management remains a rather neglected area (Samli and Ongan 
1996). Moreover, studies on contingent labour in retailing have usually focussed on part-
time work. Equally, little research on flexibility and labour market segmentation has been 
conducted in non-Western contexts (Kalleberg 2003), apart from Japan (e.g. Gadrey et al. 
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2001), even though increasing use of contingent labour appears to be a global trend with 
examples from locations such as Hong Kong (Wong 2001) and South Korea (Lee and 
Frenkel 2004). In China, dramatic changes to organization and industry are taking place 
that have major implications for work (Morris 2004), with a transition from relatively 
fixed and stable labour markets to much greater flux and heterogeneity (Gamble and 
Huang 2008 forthcoming). Scant attention, though, has been paid to the presence of 
flexible employment arrangements in this context.  
  
This paper aims to contribute to the literature through analysing employment 
arrangements in a foreign invested retail firm in China. In the first place, we document 
and analyse a form of flexible labour organization – the employment of vendor 
representatives - that has been neglected in the literature. The form delineated involves 
two employment systems existing side-by-side in which co-workers can have both 
overlapping and competing interests. We suggest that the core-periphery model is 
insufficient to capture the complexity of employment arrangements in this context. Our 
research also indicates that institutional arrangements in China including entrenched 
business practice, lack of consumer safeguards and retailers’ weakness vis-à-vis suppliers 
have a major impact on the strategies available to firms and the consequent structure of 
firm level employment relations. This evidence indicates that prevailing models over-
emphasise the extent of managerial discretion with regard to flexible workplaces.  
 
The paper is organised in the following way. The next section introduces China’s retail 
sector and its labour organization, this is followed by a review of the relevant literature 
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on contingent labour. After outlining the research methodology, we introduce the role and 
nature of vendor representatives and compare them with the store’s own regular 
employees. Subsequently we assess the consequences of the co-existence of these two 
groups of employees. The final section discusses theoretical and practical implications of 
such employment arrangements and provides our analysis to account for the form they 
take.  
 
 
2. Retail sector labour in China 
 
Between 1980 and 2005, China's GDP increased by an average of 9.7 per cent per annum. 
By 2004, measured on a purchasing power parity basis, China was already the second-
largest economy in the world after the U.S. (CIA 2005). Coterminous with this economic 
growth, employment relations have undergone substantial change. Before the reform era, 
although there were also significant numbers of temporary workers (Walder 1986: 48-54), 
most urban workers were employed by the state in relatively secure jobs that included 
substantial welfare benefits. Subsequently, labour has become increasingly commoditized, 
with increased labour flexibility and employment insecurity (Benson et al. 2000; Cooke 
2006; Taylor 2002). In addition, where once rural workers were relatively strictly 
segregated from urban workplaces, far larger numbers of migrant workers now traverse 
the urban-rural divide (Guang 2005), albeit that household registration (hukou) rules still 
underpin rural citizens secondary status in terms of their entitlement to welfare rights and 
benefits (Solinger 1999). A recent study estimated that by 2002, there were 
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approximately 150 million persons in Chinese cities and towns in flexible employment 
(Institute for Labor Studies 2004).  
 
Until 1992, foreign retail firms were largely excluded from China’s retail market. Since 
then, this sector has gradually opened to foreign involvement, a process boosted by 
commitments made as part of the country’s accession agreement to the World Trade 
Organization, which China joined in 2001. China’s growth in GDP and consumer 
spending has attracted many multinational retailers. By 2004, 4,502 foreign-invested 
stores were already operating in China (Shanghai Securities News 2005). Competition 
between both foreign and local firms has become increasingly intense.  
 
Although China is recognized as ‘factory to the world’, by 2002 services accounted for 
34 percent of China’s GDP and employed over 210 million workers contrasted to 49 
million in 1978 (Xinhua News Agency 2004). Employment patterns in China’s retail 
sector parallel the wider labour market changes outlined above, with decreased 
employment security for many workers and substantial increases in various forms of 
flexible labour. A Chinese report describes flexible employment as ‘becoming the major 
means of employment’ in labour intensive sectors such as the retail trade and catering 
(Institute for Labor Studies 2004: 17). Our study focuses on a significant new category of 
retail sector employees, vendor representatives. A vendor representative is an employee 
hired and despatched by a vendor to work in a retail store to sell the vendor’s products.  
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According to our research fieldwork, most retailers in China, both foreign invested and 
local companies, utilize large numbers of vendor representatives. This practice only 
became the dominant model during the reform era (Hanser 2007). Previously, store 
personnel were usually engaged directly by retail firms. At our case study firm, as the 
company’s reputation has spread, it has become increasingly attractive for vendors to 
send representatives to their stores. By the time of our research, the firm could easily 
attract sufficient vendor representatives through arrangements set up by the firm’s 
merchandise buyers. Indeed, in some product lines competition between vendors could be 
fierce.  
 
In fact, variants of this form of employment arrangement exist in other countries, but 
researchers have paid scant attention to this significant category of workers. 
Manufacturers’ representatives working in retail stores are common in Japan (JETRO 
2005). Martin et al. (1998) estimate that manufacturers rather than retailers compensate 
50 to 70 percent of shopfloor workers in major Japanese department stores. Their chief 
duties are to display products and explain their proper use to shoppers. Concessions also 
operate in major UK department stores, such as luggage and cosmetics counters at 
Selfridges. These stores provide space for concessionaires to sell products and receive a 
fixed amount of rental income from the concessionaire. In China, the relationship 
between store and vendor is usually one of four types: consignment sales (daixiao), 
where the store does not pay the vendor until its products are sold; collaborative sales 
(lianying), where the vendor sells its products in the store, and the store deducts a 
percentage of the vendor’s turnover as its income; store’s own sales (ziying), where the 
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store buys products from the vendor and sells them to customers; and leasing (zuling), 
which is similar to the concession arrangement in the UK.  
 
Vendor representatives’ absence in the literature constrains and limits our understanding 
not only of flexibility, but also of these organizations and HRM practices within them. 
Du Gay (1996: 156-8) mentions briefly concessions’ staff in his description of social 
groupings in two UK department stores, but does not investigate further. In retail sector 
research conducted in Asia, too, they are often neglected even in detailed ethnographic 
studies (Matsunaga 2000). A significant exception is Hanser’s (2007) recent study which 
compares employment relations in a state-owned retail store in Harbin with those in a 
private retailer. The former retained many elements of the typical state enterprise model, 
with lax disciplinary controls and long-term employment, while the latter relied primarily 
on sales staff despatched by manufacturers to work in sales areas they had rented. Our 
study delineates a mid-way variant comprising elements of both these two models, but 
contained within a single foreign invested retail store. This store employed regular 
workers who were comparable in some respects with the staff Hanser describes in the 
state owned store as well as vendor representatives, some employed directly by 
manufacturers in the way she describes in the private store, but also, and more usually, 
they were representatives of intermediate product suppliers. Our case also differed in that 
these vendor representatives worked directly alongside regular store employees and not 
in separate contracted out floor space.  
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3. Contingent Labour 
 
Researchers usually regard contingent labour as alternative forms of employment, distinct 
from traditional forms of work relationship, which is generally characterized by a single 
identifiable employer-employee relationship in which a worker has one full time job with 
a single employer (Gallagher and McLean Parks 2001; Kalleberg 2003). Contingent 
employment covers diverse ‘non-traditional’ employment arrangements, including in-
house temporaries, floats, direct hire or seasonal workers, lease workers, and even 
consultants and independent contractors (Van Breugel et al. 2005). Contingent work is 
also termed flexible work, realized by peripheral labour, consisting of temporary, part-
time, seasonal, self-employed and subcontracted workers (Hunter et al. 1993; McLean 
Parks et al. 1998; Smith 1997).  
 
The engagement of contingent labour has been viewed as an important means to increase 
labour market flexibility and enhance efficiency in work organization (Bell and Hart 
2003). Purcell and Purcell (1998) consider contingent work to be part of employers’ 
strategies with respect to the size and shape of the corporation, seeking to become slim, 
agile and responsive, differentiating between a relatively small core of employees who 
require or possess core competencies and temporary, outsourced and in-sourced labour at 
the margin. Nätti (1990) reports that the most important strategy to obtain flexibility in 
department stores has been the rapid growth of part-time work. In food retail stores, too, 
the increasing proportion of part-time workers has been a significant characteristic in 
France, Germany, the UK and Japan (Sparks 2000).  
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In dualistic labour market models, peripheral labour is contrasted with a core of 
permanent workers that perform key tasks in the flexible firm. Atkinson (1984) 
popularized the core–periphery model of flexible organizations. He differentiated 
between an inner core of employees with high levels of task flexibility, an outer core of 
peripheral employees where the achievement of numerical flexibility was paramount, and 
beyond the organization to the use of self-employed, subcontract and agency temporary 
staff, none of whom were employees of the organization.  
 
The core-peripheral labour dichotomy is, however, problematic. One key assumption in 
the literature is that the functional flexibility of a core of highly skilled employees is 
secured by the numerical flexibility of lower skilled employees (Atkinson 1984). 
However, there are several deficiencies with the assumption. Firstly, the central notion 
that functional flexibility is secured by a retained core of highly skilled employees is 
contradicted by a great deal of evidence (Ackroyd and Procter 1998). Kalleberg (2003), 
for instance, finds that part-timers may be located in both core and peripheral positions of 
the organization (see also Hakim 1990; Wong 2001).  
 
Secondly, there is no universal standard to distinguish between core and peripheral 
positions. The division of labour in terms of skills differentiates across sectors. The 
model developed in manufacturing may not be applicable to the service sector. In part, 
this is because, unlike goods-producing activity ‘service work involves primarily 
symbolic interaction – interchanges with other people that convey intangibles: 
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information, knowledge, attitudes and emotion’ (Frenkel 2000: 469). In addition, in the 
labour intensive service sector, it is more difficult to distinguish core from peripheral 
roles, as there are limits to work standardization in this sector (Frenkel 2000).  
 
In retailing, salespeople with product knowledge and good sales skills can be essential to 
retailers’ competitiveness. Accordingly, from the perspective of conventional flexibility 
theory they should be defined as core and would be expected to be permanent workers. In 
China, according to a survey conducted by the Guangzhou Consumers’ Association, sales 
staff are ‘the most important factor’ that affects customers’ purchasing decisions in 
department stores (China Consumers’ Association 2003). Thus, salespeople constitute a 
core in retail sector work and it is difficult to distinguish core salespeople from peripheral 
salespeople.  
 
Much discussion on flexibility has been limited to arrangements within single 
organizations (Rubery et al. 2002). Additionally, the focus in retailing has been upon 
part-time work and flexibility (Baret et al. 2000; Wong 2001). This overlooks alternative 
arrangements, for instance, contexts that involve workers simultaneously fulfilling 
obligations to more than one employer through the same act or behaviour (Gallagher and 
McLean Parks 2001; McLean Parks et al. 1998). There is little empirical research 
examining such contexts and work arrangements, a lacuna this paper seeks to address by 
focusing upon a work arrangement in China’s retail sector that involves more than a 
single organization.  
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In our case study, we demonstrate how retail firms utilize external ‘skilled’ workers, 
vendor representatives, who are not their own employees to conduct ‘core’ tasks of their 
business. Vendors dispatch their representatives to work in retail stores. Vendor 
representatives are under a different employment regime from that of retailers’ own 
employees as described below. They are expected to fulfil obligations to both the retailers 
and their own vendor employers. However, as we demonstrate, unexpected consequences 
can follow from this employment arrangement in terms of the relationship between the 
store and its regular employees and vendor representatives, and its impact on customers.  
 
The dominant perception that utilization of contingent labour to increase flexibility is 
determined by managerial strategy has been questioned (Atkinson 1984; Hunter et al., 
1993; Purcell and Purcell 1998). Wong (2001), for instance, found that Japanese 
department stores in Hong Kong sometimes adopted contingent labour as part of a 
planned strategy, but that often it was simply an ad hoc response to economic conditions. 
Similarly, in the UK, Hakim (1990: 157) noted that ‘Employees with a conscious core-
periphery manpower strategy constitute only a small minority’. Though useful, these 
critiques still focus attention on managerial discretion and remain firm centred (Kalleberg 
2001). This paper seeks to take the level of explanation beyond the confines of the firm, 
to indicate ways in which wider institutional environments channel and constrain firm 
level action.  
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4. Research method 
 
In this paper we seek to understand the complexities of this understudied form of 
contingent labour in the Chinese context. In particular we explore the divergences and 
fault lines between regular employees and vendor representatives. Sensitive and context-
embedded data of this kind cannot be captured in either a survey or short-term interview 
based research. As Hodson (2005) observes, reliance upon deductive and quantitative 
methods lacks the richness of insights based on direct observation of workers and 
managers. The only means to develop a phenomenological perspective that could 
ascertain more fully the tensions likely to be immanent in this workplace arrangement 
(Geary 1992), was through an in-depth ethnographic case study akin to studies conducted 
by Kunda (1992), Leidner (1993) and Matsunaga (2000). One author, a native Chinese 
speaker, spent three months at a China subsidiary of a UK multinational retailer, 
‘StoreCo’, undertaking both participant observation research and conducting semi-
structured interviews. Research of the former kind, which enables the capture of elusive, 
ambiguous and tacit aspects of research settings with rich and thick data (Linstead 1997), 
is particularly rare in the Chinese context (although see Lee 2007). Access was negotiated 
by the first author who has conducted extensive prior research both in China (e.g.  
Gamble 2003a), including at the firm in question (e.g. Gamble 2003b, 2006a, 2006b, 
2007). Over a four year period, he has undertaken 140 interviews with the firm’s 
employees, the majority conducted in Chinese with local staff, from all levels of the 
hierarchy. This prior research ensured that the authors possessed not only expertise on 
China, but also extensive knowledge about this particular firm and its operations.  
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The participant observation research followed a typical pattern for such study, it involved 
‘the ethnographer participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for an 
extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking 
questions - in fact, collecting whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that 
are the focus of the research’ (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995: 1). The researcher was 
able to observe and talk freely with both employees and customers. He developed 
relationships with employees from every level in the store’s hierarchy and was treated as 
a staff member by both employees and customers. Interaction with fellow employees 
included out of work activities such as evening meals and cigarette breaks. Observations 
were also made of everyday activities in the store, including interactions between 
employees and between employees and customers.  
 
During this participant observation research, the researcher was based for much of the 
time in one department. In order to ensure that the research data was not based unduly on 
this particular department’s employment relationships, he also conducted open-ended and 
semi-structured interviews with a representative selection of 120 (out of a total of 750) 
employees in the store, including managers, team leaders, supervisors, junior level staff 
and vendor representatives from all departments of the store, as well as security guards 
and cleaners. Most employees interviewed were selected randomly on the shopfloor in a 
process that relied upon staff being free to talk at any given time. Many interviews spread 
over more than one meeting. Questions asked included: ‘how long have you worked in 
this store?’, ‘why did you join this store?’, ‘what kind of welfare provision do you 
 14 
enjoy?’, ‘what are your working hours’, ‘what training have you received since joining 
the store?’, ‘have you encountered difficult customers’ and ‘how would you describe 
your relationship with other employees here?’.  
 
Conversations, interviews, overheard comments and descriptions of observed phenomena 
were transcribed as soon as feasibly possible. These transcripts were closely read by the 
authors to determine ‘emergent classifications and patterns’ (Taylor and Bogdan 1984), 
and formed the basis of an iterative research methodology. Research partnerships with 
regular team discussions generally ensure that their complementary insights add to the 
richness of the data (Eisenhardt 1989). The value of this process was enhanced in our 
case, since the two authors have conducted research both independently and jointly at the 
firm concerned. This allowed great scope to compare, discuss and triangulate findings; 
steps that began as soon as the research was underway and continued until the completion 
of this paper and which serve to enhance confidence in the findings.  
 
We followed the three stages of data coding: descriptive, topic and analytical (Richards 
2005). Descriptive coding involves storing information about the cases, particularly the 
key attributes. The other two steps help to gather all the text about a category. Topic 
coding labels text according to its subject and analytical coding leads to theory 
emergence and theory affirmation (ibid). In other words, each unique idea in the text was 
assigned a label or code and the text then rearranged to form themes (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). In an iterative process, data were compared within and across groups to 
identify patterns, make comparisons and contrast new and old data. In order to avoid 
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partisan research (Becker 1967), apart from the triangulation mentioned above, we also 
tried to verify the themes using different sources. For instance, we sought to confirm the 
theme of ‘unfairness felt by vendor representatives’ by verifying this with vendor 
representatives from different departments and the evidence of their longer working 
hours compared with regular store employees.  
 
The process of analysis relied heavily upon intensive discussion between the researchers 
as well as frequent rereading and interrogation of the data as delineated by Kunda (1992: 
238-40). The intention in inductive research of this kind is to develop theory that is 
‘novel, testable, and empirically valid’ (Eisenhardt 1989: 532). We also hope to have 
produced a text that conveys a fair and ‘approximate representation’ (Hirsch and Gellner 
2001: 11) of the way the people we studied present and live their lives. Thus, the quotes 
presented are representative of the main currents detected in our research.  
 
 
5. Vendor representatives 
 
In 1999, the UK retailer StoreCo opened its first decorative materials warehouse store in 
mainland China. By the end of 2006, it had 48 stores across the country and had become 
the number one home improvement retailer in China. Against the backdrop of a 
commercialised housing market, like other retail sectors, this sector is now characterised 
by ‘cutthroat competition’ (China Supply Chain Council 2006), both between foreign 
entrants and between multinationals and domestic privately owned stores and state owned 
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stores. The fieldwork was conducted at StoreCo’s largest Chinese outlet, one of its 
Beijing stores.  
 
Earlier research on StoreCo (Gamble 2003b, 2006a) indicated that the firm transferred 
many of its parent country practices. However, with respect to the use of vendor 
representatives, StoreCo replicated its local competitors (Gamble and Huang 2008). In 
2004, the Beijing store had 250 direct employees and approximately 450 vendor 
representatives. The average age of employees was 27-28 with that of vendor 
representatives slightly younger. Additionally, StoreCo had not introduced its parent 
country practice with respect to the employment of part-time staff. In the UK, although 
below the national average, StoreCo employs substantial numbers of part-time staff, 30 
per cent at one of its London stores, for instance. At the China store, by contrast, all 
workers employed directly by the firm were full-timers on one year renewable contracts. 
There were also two other groups of workers in the store, about 30 security guards and 23 
cleaners, who were outsourced to security and cleaning companies respectively. These 
arrangements are not discussed further since they match those in the existing literature on 
outsourced employment (e.g. Davidov 2004; Deery and Walsh 2002; Purcell and Purcell 
1998). Rather, this paper focuses on the under researched category of employees, vendor 
representatives.  
 
As noted above, vendor representatives are employees hired and dispatched by a vendor 
to work in a retail store to sell the vendor’s products. The length of time spent at the store 
varies depending on the vendor’s discretion. Vendor representatives differ from the 
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consignment workers Wong (2001) describes in Hong Kong in that they work directly 
alongside regular store staff, whereas the latter are responsible for separately rented floor 
space. The term ‘vendor’s representative’ (changshang daibiao) is often used 
interchangeably with ‘vendor promoter’ (changjia chuxiaoyuan) and ‘manufacturer’s 
informant’ (changjia xinxiyuan) across different retailers and regions. There are 
differences within this group of salespeople; for instance, some are hired directly by 
manufacturers or their local branches, while others are hired by manufacturers’ local 
sales agencies. In essence, though, they are labour dispatched by suppliers, working 
under a similar employment arrangement to that described in this paper. Vendors also 
hired small numbers of temporary promoters, but this paper concentrates on full-time 
workers.  
 
 
6. Comparison of vendor representatives and store employees 
 
To help understand this type of employment relationship, we compare vendor 
representatives’ employment arrangements with those of the store’s own regular 
employees. Although our observations showed that customers generally identified the 
two groups of employees identically as customer assistants, they operate under quite 
different employment systems, with differing terms of contract, pay, income, welfare 
provision and management (See Table 1), which in turn lead to differentially perceived 
relationships between themselves and the store by the two groups of employees 
respectively.  
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
Regular store employees generally enjoy job security, while vendor representatives are 
unlikely to have either an implicit or an explicit contract with the vendor. Vendor 
representatives also tend to have less secured income than store employees, that is, basic 
salary. Usually, vendor representatives are not regarded as formal employees by vendors 
but, rather, as temporary workers. Vendors, then, are flexible firms and vendor 
representatives contingent labour without employment security and welfare benefits. 
Frontline store employees are entitled to a bonus when their department’s sales target is 
achieved. However, achieving departmental sales targets is irrelevant to vendor 
representatives, their extra income, beyond basic salary, comes from commission on sales 
of the particular brand or products they work for and is paid by the vendor. Some vendor 
representatives, particularly those working for large and popular brands, can earn more 
than store employees, based on the level of their sales. However, this is mostly restricted 
to a few essential products for home decoration, for example, tile, flooring and showroom 
products. For instance, one vendor representative in her early 40s for a famous boiler 
brand admitted that she had earned about 10,000 RMB (US $1,250) in the best month, 
this compared with regular employees average monthly salary of 1,200 RMB (US $150). 
However, she emphasized, ‘this happiness is seasonal. In the worst month we got nothing 
except the basic salary of a few hundred RMB!’.  
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To some extent, although their work overlaps, there is a division of labour between 
vendor representatives and store employees. Store employees are also called lihuoyuan, 
literally, merchandise management staff. They are mainly responsible for stocktaking, 
replenishment and layout. Vendor representatives, who are more familiar with products, 
focus on selling to customers. Accordingly, they are classified as xiaoshuo guwen, sales 
consultants or advisors, by the store. Several store employees vividly described the 
division between them, as in the case of a building materials department employee who 
recalled:  
 
During the early stage, when the store had just opened, we store employees were 
afraid of being asked questions by customers. Not being able to answer customers’ 
questions…we stepped back to avoid customers and left the vendor representatives to 
receive them.  
 
Even a year after the store opened, and despite the firm’s efforts to train its staff (Gamble 
2006a), most store employees still admitted, like a customer assistant in the hardware 
department, that ‘we’re not as professional in sales as them (xiaoshou bu ru tamen 
zhuanye).’ Vendor representatives often teach store employees product knowledge and 
demonstrate sales skills, in either the storewide morning briefings or departmental 
briefings, as required by the store.  
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While store employees occasionally work overtime, vendor representatives frequently 
work beyond their usual working hours. In part, this is because vendor representatives 
seek to increase their income by selling more products during these extra hours. However, 
they are frequently compelled to work overtime since many vendors have only one or a 
few representatives working in the store, but they must have staff on duty to cover all the 
hours from 8:30 until 21:00. Store employees receive benefits including housing fund 
contribution, pension, medical care and unemployment insurance. By contrast, few 
vendor representatives receive these benefits. As the previously mentioned female vendor 
representative in her 40s complained, ‘we earn nothing except basic salary and unreliable 
commission for our hard work! We can’t afford to be ill…’  
 
Despite their often inferior pay and conditions compared to store employees, vendor 
representatives have to go through two layers of recruitment procedures, compared with 
only one for store employees. This could be taken to indicate vendor representatives 
importance to the store. Employees recruited directly by the store need only pass the 
store’s recruitment process. Vendor representatives have first to be selected by a vendor 
and then to satisfy the store’s interview. When joining a store, they are expected to attend 
more training and are under greater pressure to learn quickly than store employees. 
StoreCo requires vendors to provide training to their vendor representatives before they 
start work in its stores; this is mostly about product knowledge and sales skills. By 
contrast, new store employees are allowed to pass their department’s product knowledge 
test during the first three months of their employment. Vendor representatives must also 
attend induction training. However, newly recruited store employees and vendor 
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representatives are not trained together, probably because the training contents for them 
differ. Store employees’ induction training covers the company’s history, culture, 
operational procedures, welfare and discipline. Although vendor representatives’ 
induction training also briefly includes all these elements, with the exception of welfare, 
it focuses more on discipline. The management regime can be described as ‘hard’ for 
vendor representatives and ‘soft’ for store employees (Storey 1987).  
 
The stricter management regime for vendor representatives is evident in other respects. 
Although legally the vendor is the vendor representative’s employer, in practice the 
representative undertakes work for both the vendor and the store, on the premises of the 
store. The store defines, controls, supervises and disciplines activities performed by the 
vendor representative. Vendor representatives, then, are under more levels of supervision 
than store employees. Like store employees, they are under supervision of the store 
management, but they are also under surveillance of the vendors’ monitoring team (yewu 
zhuguang), a group dispatched by vendors to regularly patrol the stores where their 
products are sold. Additionally, apart from the store management, ordinary store 
employees, in particular ‘key employees’ (hexin yuangong) nominated by department 
managers, are empowered to supervise them.  
 
Differences between the two groups of employees are reflected in their respective 
handbooks. The store employees’ handbook focuses primarily on employees’ benefits 
and entitlements, covering in detail aspects such as pay and hours of work, including 
overtime payment, holiday, sickness and maternity leave entitlements, welfare, and 
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training and development. By contrast, the vendor representatives’ handbook is only half 
the size of that for store employees and concentrates more on rules and punishments 
including vendor representative service rules, customer service rules and customer 
service standards that are absent from the store employees’ handbook.  
 
Since few store employees had been disciplined, most believed the store’s management 
style to be ‘loose’ and ‘relaxed’. By contrast, several vendor representatives explained 
that they had been fined for misconduct such as lateness. In one instance, one author 
witnessed a hinge product vendor representative be dismissed by a deputy store manager 
immediately after she had refused to apologize to a customer. The latter had complained 
of the vendor representative’s ‘bad attitude’ and demanded an apology. In contrast, at 
least in principle, a store regular employee would only have received an oral or a written 
warning for such behaviour (Employees’ Handbook 2002: 20). 
 
Extensive use of vendor representatives was accompanied by high worker turnover, either 
voluntary or involuntary. The store could dismiss vendor representatives as shown above. 
In addition, vendors dispatched their vendor representatives according to their own needs 
and could withdraw or reassign them to other stores at short notice. On the other hand, 
vendor representatives could feel a greater burden under double pressures from the store 
and their vendors and quit for other options.  
 
The above comparisons indicate that store employees have characteristics of core 
workers, receiving good pay, benefits and job security. In contrast, compared with store 
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employees’ stable, secure employment with good prospects of long term employment, 
vendor representatives’ jobs are unstable and insecure with lower pay and little prospect 
of career development. Vendor representatives receive few or no social security benefits; 
are under more management control; the duration of their working with the store is 
flexible, dependent upon the vendors’ discretion; and their product knowledge, sales and 
customer service skills are vital to the store.  
 
The latter point is of particular importance since it refers to a key competence directly 
linked to the firm’s core business, since a defining aspect of sales work is that it involves 
front-line workers actively stimulating demand and encouraging customers to purchase a 
good or service (Korczynski 2002). Thus, it is an essential function of core labour in the 
retail sector. By contrast, the other four points are characteristic of peripheral labour. In 
this sense, vendor representatives are peripheral labour undertaking the work of core 
labour. Meanwhile, store employees enjoy all the benefits of core employees assumed in 
the literature, but often undertake work that is less essential to the store’s core activity. In 
such cases, as Rubery et al. (2002) suggest, organizations might be unaware of the 
contradictions involved when using a fragmented employment system.  
 
 
7. Consequences of a bifurcated workplace 
  
The use of vendor representatives brings benefits to both the store and vendors. The store 
increases its labour force flexibility and, since t
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not at the store’s cost, reduces its labour costs. Vendor representatives provide the store 
with key competences in terms of their product knowledge and sales and service skills, 
thereby allowing them to acquire skills without incurring training costs (Voudouris 2004). 
The arrangement can also provide a cheap screening process to assist in recruitment and 
selection, a phenomenon noted with workers employed through temporary work agencies 
(Davidov 2004; Ward et al. 2001). For example, two building materials product vendor 
representatives in their 40s became store employees after working at the store for two 
months, because ‘the department’s manager found us to have a good, down-to-earth 
attitude and prepared to obey his leadership (tinghua)’.  
 
Although the relationship between store employees and vendor representatives is meant 
to be cooperative and synergistic, the coexistence of two groups of employees created 
new dilemmas. One potential problem is the ‘fly order’, any transaction that happens with 
a customer outside the store’s control by a vendor representative. The presence of two 
groups of employees with different employers can also produce complicated work 
relationships in ways that mirror the animosity Geary (1992) found between temporary 
and permanent workers in US electronics firms in Ireland. The previous section 
compared the different working conditions between store employees and vendor 
representatives and showed the structural inequality between them. Various forms of 
segregation symbolized the existence of this unequal relationship. The boundary between 
them was particularly evident during morning briefings, when vendor representatives 
stood in the middle of the assembled staff, encircled by store employees. Kalleberg (2003) 
found that when employers in America used flexibility strategies peripheral workers 
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could be perceived by core employees as ‘outsiders’. Similarly, in Australian banks, 
Walsh (2007) reports how part-time staff could feel a ‘status divide’ between themselves 
and full-time employees.  
 
StoreCo’s regular store employees routinely regarded vendor representatives as 
‘outsiders’ and themselves as ‘insiders’. In one instance, a tile section employee rebuked 
a vendor representative simply because she read his sick leave form. The vendor 
representative began to cry. When a Human Resource Department manager investigated 
this incident, he explained, with a sound of justice on his side, ‘Vendor representatives 
are not allowed to know the company’s secrets!’. On the other hand, vendor 
representatives could hold negative perceptions of store employees. On one occasion, 
several vendor representatives were overheard complaining how difficult it was to seek 
assistance from store employees. One of them remarked bitterly, ‘it’s f***ing difficult to 
get them [regular] employees to do something for us, even such a simple thing as printing 
out a correct price tag!’  
 
Store employees had good reason to feel superior to vendor representatives, as outlined 
above their conditions were superior to the vendor representatives. Meanwhile, vendor 
representatives might consider it unfair that store employees reaped the fruits of their 
labour, because the achievement of sales targets, based on which store employees 
received bonuses, was due in part at least to their efforts. Although the company’s 
rhetoric claimed consistently that employees and vendor representatives were equal and a 
‘single family’ (yi jia ren), as indicated differential treatment was apparent in many 
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aspects. One way for vendor representatives to overcome this was to try to become 
regular store employees. However, at the time of our fieldwork, few vendor 
representatives were allowed to become store employees. Alternatively, vendor 
representatives could become resistant towards their work in the store, as shown below.  
 
Since department managers and supervisors manage their department’s employees and 
vendor representatives and store employees can be empowered to be in charge of vendor 
representatives, it can be argued that this constitutes an informal hierarchy within the 
store, equivalent to Coleman’s (1987) hierarchical model of power within organizations. 
In turn, the informal or latent structure involved in such a ‘hidden hierarchy’ (Smith 1994) 
can lead to the hierarchical abuse of power (Vredenburgh and Brender 1998) and 
workplace bullying (Vandekerckhove and Commers 2002), as in the example of the tile 
section employee rebuking a vendor representative.  
 
Vendor representatives’ structurally inferior position can have negative impacts on their 
commitment, turnover and performance. Research indicates that distrust and perceptions 
of unfairness can have negative consequences, such as increased co-worker infighting 
and reduction in performance (Hodson 2005; Pearce 1993). One author watched a deputy 
store manager tell a vendor representative to push an empty trolley left on the aisle by a 
customer back to the ground floor. Her body language showed her reluctance, but she 
began pushing the trolley away. When she noticed that the manager was no longer 
watching her, she abandoned the trolley in a corner on the same floor.  
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Vendor representatives have low commitment to their host employer, the store, as their 
frequently short-term work assignments in the store militate against the development of 
emotional involvement and organizational commitment. Even if vendor representatives 
stay with the store for a relatively long time, the structurally unequal nature of their 
relationship with store employees and the store hinders such a development. 
Organizational identity has been shown to be a key issue in shaping workers’ 
organizational commitment (Guest 1998), since vendor representatives are not the store’s 
employees they see no reason to identify with its values and be loyal. Legally, vendors 
are their employers and they might show commitment to vendors instead of the store, as 
indicated in the problem of fly orders.  
 
Ward et al. (2001) report that use of temporary agency workers often brings new sources 
of contradiction to the host organization. This was also apparent at StoreCo. For example, 
while the company endeavours to develop employees’ product knowledge and service 
skills (Gamble 2006a), with vendor representatives present StoreCo’s regular employees 
could feel less motivation to learn product knowledge. Regular employees sometimes 
complained about product knowledge and exams as an extra work burden. A tile section 
employee commented:  
 
We’re too tired after a long day’s work to read the product knowledge papers… It 
may be necessary for us to know the products in our own departments, but why 
should we know about products in other departments? What’s the point of the vendor 
representatives then?  
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This, in turn, could have the unanticipated consequence of reducing the potential for 
functional flexibility within the store. Additionally, as shown below, reliance on vendor 
representatives and the expectation that they would undertake the lead role in customer 
service lead to the neglect of some customers.  
 
Conflicts and contradictions were not limited to those between store employees and 
vendor representatives. Relationships between vendor representatives could also be 
problematic because of the nature of their role. Although generally vendor representatives 
had a sense of belonging to the same outsider group of ‘us’ in contrast to ‘them’, store 
employees, relationships between vendor representatives who sold competing products 
could be tense. For instance, several paint vendor representatives complained that an 
imported paint vendor bribed store employees of the paint department: 
 
They turn a blind eye towards the excessive number of its vendor representatives, 
who threatened to beat us after work because they thought we snatched their 
customers when we introduced our products to customers looking around. We have 
to worry about our safety working here!  
 
In one instance, two vendor representatives working for different boiler brands came to 
blows after confronting each other when trying to secure a customer’s interest in their 
respective products. Furthermore, since most vendor representatives are not vendors’ 
formal employees, they might lack commitment not only to the store, but also to the 
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vendor. They tend to perceive themselves as individual agents, seeking to make as much 
money for themselves as possible. Ensuring contingent workers’ motivation and 
commitment in such organizational contexts can be problematic (Coyle-Shapiro and 
Kessler 2002). Perceptions of unfairness and lower levels of employee satisfaction and 
commitment, can negatively affect customer service (Deery and Walsh 2002). The 
violent confrontation mentioned above did not help retain the customer for either of the 
vendor representatives. Instead, it scared the customer and damaged the store’s image.  
 
Vendor representatives are enthusiastic and helpful to those who show interest in their 
products, but can be indifferent towards other customers. Although the store’s customer 
service rules and standards for them include providing help to all customers when needed, 
vendor representatives might seek to avoid these obligations  The struggle between 
vendors and the store lead to poor customer service and customer dissatisfaction most 
obviously when customers wished to return goods. To maintain and enhance its brand 
image the store aimed to satisfy customers’ demands. However, to achieve its cost 
control targets the store exerts pressure on vendors to shoulder the burden of the cost. 
Meanwhile, vendors seek to maintain their own cost control and resist this pressure from 
the store; moreover, their interest in maintaining the store’s image is limited. Customers 
often become caught between the store and the vendors and their representatives, a recipe 
for customer dissatisfaction. Their anger often increasing when they had to visit the store 
several times to replace an item or obtain a refund. On one such occasion, a couple in 
their late 30s were overheard to shout at the service desk staff:  
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What a store! We’ve come several times. Every time we have to repeat the same 
story for half an hour…can’t we have a person who can solve our problem? Last 
time [three days before], we were told that we’d be given a solution to our 
problem the next day, but nothing has happened! You can’t simply push us to the 
supplier again!’.  
 
 
8. Discussion 
 
This section assesses the core-periphery model in the light of the data presented in this 
paper. In particular, it questions assumptions this model makes about ‘core’ and 
‘periphery’ as well as the assumption, often implicit, that firms have a free hand in 
designing flexible labour systems. We argue that multinational retail stores’ use of 
vendor representatives is constrained and partially determined by institutional factors 
such as entrenched local business practice and lack of consumer safeguards. Finally, we 
outline practical implications of this employment system for both firms and employees.  
 
The core-periphery model provides a useful tool to help understand employment relations 
in flexible workplaces. Vendor representatives’ work arrangements, though, challenge 
available theories on contingent labour from several perspectives. According to the 
criteria of much of the existing literature, the store’s own employees can be considered as 
core labour, for instance, with respect to their secure and stable employment. However, 
they tend to perform an ancillary role in the core business competence or function of the 
 31 
retail business, namely, sales and customer service. This is also evident in the numbers of 
employees and vendor representatives respectively seen and approached by customers in 
the store. By contrast, another category of labour that can be considered contingent, 
working alongside them in the store, undertake the bulk of these key roles.  
 
Our findings build upon earlier research such as Walsh’s (1990) study of nine companies 
in the UK retailing and hospitality industry which suggested that part-time, temporary 
and casual staff constituted a core, rather than a peripheral component of the workforce 
and that such employees were not in fact supplementary to a firm’s business activities. 
Similarly, Gadrey et al. (2001) found that in Japan’s retail sector, part-time staff could 
not readily be construed as either peripheral or core employees. Manifestly the core-
periphery model fails to capture the complexity of these service sector employment 
arrangements. We showed that vendor representatives are another category that shares the 
ambivalent status noted for some part-time staff and outlined some of the consequences 
this brings.  
 
Sturdy and Korczynski (2004) suggest that customer orientated workplaces need to be 
analyzed using a model that takes into account a triangular relationship of 
employer/management, employee and customer. This paper highlights a context in which 
four parties are involved, in which vendors also play a role with vendor representatives as 
their agents. Complexity is increased in this four-sided context; vendor representatives 
and retailers are often motivated by differing interests and customers have to face an 
extra layer of interest representatives. Moreover, the presence of vendor representatives 
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alongside store employees and their structurally bifurcated employment arrangements 
constitutes a ‘hidden hierarchy’ (Smith 1994).  
 
Korczynski (2002) argues that contemporary service work often involves dual and 
potentially contradictory logics: those of efficiency and cost minimization encountering 
those of the customer and customer orientation. As he observes, employees and 
customers can often be caught between these conflicting demands. We highlight a 
context in which this contradiction is magnified as the competing logics are played out as 
two parallel, but differing, sets of conflicting logics, i.e. those of the store and its 
employees and that of the vendors and their employees. The way the struggle between 
vendors and the store could lead to poor customer service and customer dissatisfaction 
indicates some of the potentially negative outcomes.  As we demonstrated, customers 
could become trapped between the store’s desire to present a positive brand image and 
their and the vendors’ aim to maintain cost control targets  
 
Much of the literature suggests that a flexible firm can deliberately design contingent 
labour arrangements. Ironically, at one point StoreCo planned to replace all vendor 
representatives with their own regular employees, a decision provoked by the difficulties 
involved in managing vendor representatives and concern over image consistency. 
However, this initiative from the store’s parent company headquarters in the UK was 
strongly resisted at the operational level, particularly by buyers and store managers, who 
believed that such an action would disadvantage them against competitors and damage 
sales. The store conducted a trial of this plan in the hardware department, but it failed 
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within two months as sales dropped. The manager who oversaw this experiment 
explained that by comparison with the vendor representatives, the store’s regular 
employees lacked expertise and motivation in seeking to secure sales. One of the authors 
was invited by the store manager to observe the behaviour of employees in this 
department. In more than fifteen minutes of observation, only two employees were seen 
around the department: one employee hung around for two minutes and then disappeared 
while the other appeared to wander aimlessly, ignoring visiting customers. The store 
manager sighed, ‘he does not know what he is doing here!’ This contrasted sharply with 
the proactive customer service approach typical among vendor representatives.  
 
Some vendor representatives reported that a similar trial had also ended in failure at a 
nearby locally-owned building materials retailer. Use of this form of labour arrangement 
might not be a component of a planned HR strategy. It has often been argued that the use 
of contingent labour generates internal flexibility in order to secure the jobs of core staff 
(Cappelli and Neumark 2004; Ward et al. 2001). This makes sense if the core staff’s 
skills are essential to the firm, but does not explain why retailers need to protect their 
own employees when they play a less important role in sales and service, which is a key 
competence and essential to their business success.  
 
It is possible to suggest several factors that account for foreign invested firms’ 
willingness to adopt local firms use of vendor representatives. Firstly, multinational firms 
face a context in which the entrenched business practice is for suppliers to provide staff 
as sales personnel. They might be inclined to take the line of least resistance and mimic 
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this practice, thereby meeting the normative expectations of both their vendors and sales 
staff.  Secondly, the numerical flexibility provided by vendor representatives constitutes a 
functional equivalent to their parent country use of part-time and temporary staff, they 
also provide low cost labour that can be supplemented or reduced at minimal cost and 
with few formalities. Thirdly, for foreign entrants in a highly competitive and rapidly 
expanding sector in which a ready-trained workforce is insufficient, utilizing vendor 
representatives provides a means to rapidly bolster their sales forces’ knowledge and 
skills base. The importance of this factor is enhanced by the lack of institutional 
safeguards in China’s consumer market. In making purchases, consumers are often 
cautious as they face several possible pitfalls, for example, fake products and difficulty in 
returning or seeking recompense for faulty or unwanted products. In our fieldwork, we 
found that most customers actively compare different stores. They might not know either 
what to buy or which store to trust. Apart from equipping themselves with product 
knowledge, consumers usually turn to sales staff for advice (Gamble 2007). Multinational 
retailers’ rapid expansion in China ensures that employee skills lag behind firms’ growth.  
 
Fourthly, lower wage costs in China reduce the pressure to increase reliance on part-time 
staff; they can retain relatively large numbers of full-time employees (double the number 
of an equivalent sized UK store, for instance). A fifth factor might be retailers relative 
weakness vis-à-vis suppliers, in contrast to the situation that has developed in the UK, for 
instance. Although this situation is now changing, in the early years of the reform era 
retailers were fragmented and vendors keen to promote sales of their products in a newly 
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competitive marketplace, one means to do this was to place their representatives in stores 
(Hanser 2007).  
 
Gadrey et al.’s (2001: 181) suggestion that workplace labour segments be theorized as 
‘socially constructed, with historical, national and industry specificities’ also offers a 
potential route to account for the form of employment relationship we outline. They 
compare and analyse employment segmentation in the retail trade in Japan and France 
against the background of family structures and norms in these countries. In part, the 
multinational’s inability to replicate its parent country approach to increase flexibility, 
which is heavily reliant upon part-time workers, can be related to the low level of part 
time working in China. Since the Communist revolution, both men and women have been 
expected to work full time.  
 
China’s segmented labour market, thanks to its household registration (hukou) system 
and the related, deeply entrenched urban-rural gap, also appears to play an important part 
in the employment arrangement we examine (cf. Guang 2005). Significantly, most 
vendor representatives did not have Beijing residency (hukou), while the majority 
(between two thirds and three quarters) of regular store employees were Beijing 
residents.1 Possessing a rural household registration restricts access to urban social 
welfare benefits and educational and medical provision (Solinger 1999). If they were 
Beijing residents, vendor representatives were also more likely to have been workers laid 
off from state owned enterprises, another form of exclusion from many benefits. Often, 
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vendor representatives’ peripheral status inside the firm replicates and reinforces their 
structurally inferior, second class status outside the workplace.  
 
At the same time, the path dependent expectation of regular employees might be to 
expect security of employment of the kind that state owned enterprises once offered. This 
might incline both foreign and domestic firms to try to provide relatively secure 
employment to their regular employees. Our research also indicated reluctance on the 
part of many Beijing citizens’ to take up what are perceived as menial service sector jobs. 
This tendency is likely to spread as urban Chinese workers’ educational level and 
expectations continue to rise. The features we have outlined call into question the 
prevalent depiction of forms of contingent labour as being determined by managerial 
strategy and suggest that prevailing models over-emphasise the extent of managerial 
discretion with regard to the structure of flexible workplaces.   
 
 
Implications for Firms and Employees 
 
We have indicated that the presence of two structurally bifurcated workforce groups 
performing the role of customer assistants in a single workplace created various problems 
for management. Similarly, at both of their case study organizations, Ward et al. (2001) 
found that the use of temporary agency workers often brought new sources of 
contradictions, and issues related to the employment relationship were regularly seen to 
conflict with other corporate goals (cf Geary 1992). The presence of ‘less visible 
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hierarchical differentiation’ (Smith 1994: 301) in otherwise relatively flat organizations 
can be problematic. In practice, such features run counter to the notion of strategic HRM. 
The co-existence of two employment systems within one organization challenges 
conventional HRM theories, which mostly assume single, unitary organizations.  
 
Organizations must be aware of the contradictions involved when using a fragmented 
employment system. This might be especially important in customer orientated 
businesses, where providing quality service work is essential to attract and retain 
customers. Maintaining internal consistency and presenting a seamless image to 
customers (Rubery et al. 2002) - crucial aspects of a firm’s competitive advantage - can 
be problematic in these conditions. For example, the retailer in question in this paper did 
not require vendor representatives to possess product knowledge beyond their vendors’ 
products. Meanwhile, store employees felt less motivated to learn product knowledge 
with the availability of vendor representatives, who are expected to have expertise. The 
presence of a bifurcated workplace also enhances the difficulties involved in developing 
appropriate strategies of control in the workplaces of interactive service employees.  
Solving problems of this kind and motivating workers with different employment 
arrangements is crucial to the delivery of quality service and customer satisfaction; these 
dimensions are also closely related to employee satisfaction and loyalty (Deery and 
Walsh 2002).  
 
The workplace arrangements we outline also have consequences for employees.  In many 
respects, the inequalities of treatment inside the store parallel broader and pervasive 
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inequalities that have developed in Chinese society during the reform era. Increased 
labour market flexibility has been a major component of China’s economic reforms 
(Benson et al. 2000; Taylor 2002). Despite the macro-economic benefits this has helped 
bring, some researchers perceive a deteriorating situation for many Chinese workers 
(Chan 2001). In her comparison between a state-owned retail firm and a private retail 
firm in Harbin, Hanser (2007) contrasts the atomizing consequences of reliance upon 
sales staff employed by manufacturers in the latter with the solidarity of workers in the 
former firm. Our study tends toward a broadly similar conclusion in this regard, but with 
the added complication that the two forms coexist side-by-side in a single workplace. 
There seemed little likelihood that the two groups of workers would join in common 
cause to promote their interests given their structurally different positions. Such potential 
might be further undermined given that vendor representatives’ presence constitutes a 
latent threat for regular employees that vendor representatives could replace their jobs. 
Competition between vendor representatives also tends to fracture relations between them. 
Additionally, regular employees’ solidarity in this relatively newly established foreign 
firm, although significant was less deeply embedded than Hanser reports in the state 
owned enterprise.  
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
The research reported in this paper indicates that what appears to be a worldwide trend 
towards increased flexibility in labour market practices is increasingly evident in Chinese 
 39 
workplaces. The form of practices outlined, though, are influenced by specific 
institutional characteristics of the country in question. This paper has demonstrated that 
in contemporary China two employment systems can co-exist in one retail store. The 
form of employment delineated, the use of vendor representatives, goes beyond usual 
forms of flexibility within single organizations (Rubery et al. 2002). This work 
arrangement involves the situation where a worker simultaneously fulfils obligations to 
more than one employer through the same act or behaviour (Gallagher and McLean Parks 
2001). We examined the characteristics of this form of employment by comparison with 
store employees, a traditional form of labour. Significantly, we note the extent to which 
workers who are treated as contingent peripheral employees fulfil core tasks within the 
firm. It was found that use of such an employment arrangement creates various dilemmas 
and may run counter to companies’ goals and strategies.  
 
The focus in much of the core-periphery literature is upon what happens within the 
confines of the firm (Kalleberg, 2001). Like Colvin (2006), we argue that even in an era 
of globalization, local institutions continue to shape organizational employment strategies 
and actions. Our research underscores the necessity to locate firm level employment 
relations within the broader institutional contexts that both constrain and help define them. 
In China, politically determined social structures and labour market and social norms 
have a major impact on the strategies that are open to firms and the consequent structure 
of firm level employment relations. In the case of vendor representatives, for instance, 
many enter the workplace already imbued with peripheral status, a status further 
reinforced by the nature of their employment.  
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This paper has outlined a little understood form of labour arrangement; however, many 
questions remain unanswered. It remains to be seen whether this form of employment 
arrangement will persist in Chinese stores and if foreign invested stores will continue to 
adopt this ‘local’ model of operating. For multinational firms, used to deriving numerical 
flexibility in their parent country operation through the employment of large numbers of 
part-time employees, vendor representatives constitute at least a partial functional 
equivalent. However, if labour costs rise, as they are doing, both multinational and local 
firms might seek to challenge this entrenched employment model. This model might also 
come under pressure as retailers’ power increases vis-à-vis suppliers and as they seek to 
develop further control over both the workers in their stores and the consistency of 
customer service. The model might also come under pressure as the normative 
expectation for both men and women to work full-time gradually erodes, as we anticipate 
is likely to happen as, for instance, students seek to work part-time to help bear the heavy 
cost of higher education and as married women become less inclined to pursue full-time 
work.  
 
Much work also needs to be done to explore similar employment arrangements both in 
China and in other countries. For instance, do analogous employment relationships have 
similar consequences in the catering and construction industries in China? Will China’s 
new Labour Contract Law that came into effect on 1 January 2008 and which includes a 
section apparently designed to protect the interests of agency despatched labour affect 
vendor representatives? There is also scope to compare how the employment 
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arrangement analysed in this paper differs from the system of concessions in the West 
and in other Asian countries. What are the consequences for workforce commitment and 
motivation in such employment contexts? To what extent can strategic HRM be 
implemented in workplaces in which two employment systems coexist? Is the use of 
contingent workers to undertake ‘core’ tasks an increasing trend and what is its 
significance for both work organisation and workers? Further research in this area will 
also be fruitful to better understand not only the full range of employment experiences, 
but also the manifest difficulties that stymie contingent workers from securing both fairly 
rewarded employment and a meaningful ‘voice’ in the workplace.  
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Notes 
 
1. In a local department store near StoreCo, all regular staff were expected to have a 
Beijing hukou. In a nearby local building materials store, while most regular staff did not 
need to have a Beijing hukou, as in StoreCo its cashiers did. This indicates control over 
finance as a core activity and suggests that trust is limited to [here Beijing] ‘insiders’.  
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Table 1 Comparison of Store Employees and Vendor Representatives 
 
 Store Employee Vendor Representative 
Employer Store  Vendor but not normally vendor’s 
formal employee 
Contract  Yes Mostly not 
Length of 
employment with the 
store 
Generally long term Mostly short term, dependent upon 
performance and vendors’ 
discretion 
Average monthly 
income 
1,200 RMB plus bonus Basic salary 500-1,000 RMB plus 
commission 
Bonus  Yes, paid by store  Occasionally, paid by vendor 
Insurance Yes  Mostly not 
Pension  Yes  Mostly not 
Housing fund 
contribution 
Yes  Mostly not 
Levels of 
supervision 
Store Store and vendor 
Education Mostly high school (12 
years education) 
High school and secondary school 
(9 to 12 years education) 
Training  Store Both store and vendor, but less 
induction training 
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Recruitment 
approval 
Store Vendor and store 
Management fees No Yes  
HR regime Soft  Hard  
Working hours Relatively fixed, little 
overtime 
Flexible, longer, frequent overtime 
Discipline  Loose  
Subject to store managers’ 
supervision 
Stricter by store, e.g. fines 
Subject to store managers’ and 
vendors’ supervision 
Loyalty  Store Vendor? 
Service provision All customers Preference for customers who buy 
their firm’s products 
Relationship with 
store employees 
‘We’/store employees vs. 
‘they’/vendor 
representatives 
‘We’/vendor representative 
outsiders vs. ‘they’/store 
employees 
Gender More male Predominantly female 
Household 
registration (hukou) 
Majority Beijing Mostly from outside Beijing 
 
                                                 
 
